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The history of the production of cultural property in the United States
follows the same pattern as the history of the racial divide that inaugurated
the founding of the Republic. The original U.S. Constitution excluded both
black women and men from the blessings of liberty. Meanwhile, that same
Constitution granted rights to authors and inventors in what is known as the
Patent/Copyright Clause of Article I, Section 8.1 This clause laid the
foundation for intellectual property (“IP”) rights that have become an
economic juggernaut not only in the United States, but globally.2 IP rights
are inextricably tied to cultural and scientific production, which influences
all aspects of society. Thus, before the passage of the major civil rights
amendments and acts, the provisions of Article I, Section 8 were
unavailable to protect the cultural rights of early black Americans.
*
Associate Professor, Thomas Jefferson School of Law, San Diego CA, J.D. Yale
Law School.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (announcing that Congress has the power to promote the
progress of science and the arts by securing, for a limited time, the rights to artistic
works and discoveries as the property of the artist).
2. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Balancing Act: Reflections on Justice O’Connor’s
Intellectual Property Jurisprudence, 44 HOUST. L. REV. 965, 975 (2007) (noting that
the expansion of intellectual property in the United States has helped to “underwrite
U.S. dominance in the intellectual property sector of the global economy”).
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Congress enacted laws mandating racial equality and effectively protecting
the intellectual property rights of blacks in the arts and sciences only within
the past few decades.3
This Article briefly explores how women artists, particularly black
women, have been impacted by the IP system, and compares how both
blacks and women have a shared commonality of treatment with
indigenous peoples and their creative works. The treatment of blacks,
women, and indigenous peoples in the IP system reflects the unfortunate
narrative of exploitation, devaluation, and promotion of derogatory
stereotypes that helped fuel oppression in the United States, and in the case
of indigenous peoples, both here and abroad. The treatment of women
blues artists in the IP system illustrates the racial and gendered nature of IP
rights, and that IP has been central to racial subordination from both an
economic and cultural standpoint. However, examining inequality in the IP
context is not merely a backwards-looking narrative. Racial and gender
dynamics offer unique insights that can guide reforms to the IP system with
a view toward benefiting, in Derrick Bell’s words, the least-advantaged
“faces at the bottom” of our society.4
Traditionally, IP scholarship and jurisprudence has not focused on race
and gender inequality. However, these issues are receiving renewed
attention in feminist scholarship and in critiques of existing power
structures by those concerned with the treatment of people of color,
women, and indigenous peoples in the international arena. Analytical
inquiries that explore the rights of minorities, women, and indigenous
peoples enhance the debate about IP reforms. Further, a focus on the least
advantaged segments of society, such as blues women, shifts the debate to
focus on the empowerment of artists who create, and not on empowerment
of large conglomerates that control IP in the United States and abroad.
Part I of this Article, briefly discusses the tenets of critical race theory to
show that it can be useful in explaining how IP law has disadvantaged
African-American artists and fostered their subordination. Part II explores
how feminist critiques of IP benefit from examining the treatment of black
women, using blues women of the 1920s as a focal point. Part III examines
how the treatment of indigenous peoples parallels IP deprivations of blacks
and women.
3. See, e.g., Drew S. Days, III, “Feedback Loop”: The Civil Rights Act of 1964
and Its Progeny, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 981, 981-82 (2005) (outlining the major civil
rights statutes passed by Congress throughout the mid- to late 1960s in the aftermath of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including laws bringing racial equality to public
accommodations, employment discrimination, and housing discrimination).
4. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF
RACISM 3 (Basic Books 1992) (arguing that black Americans remain a disadvantaged
class, and any advances made in the 1960s and 1970s have been reversed in all basic
measures of poverty, unemployment, and income).
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I. THE EMERGENCE OF RACE IN LEGAL ANALYSIS
Many legal scholars increasingly recognize that the examination of race
in legal discourse serves to illuminate the merits and values of the law.5 In
contrast, before the 1980s, legal scholarship “virtually ignored legal
theorizing based on the perspectives of people of color.”6 The invisibility
of race in legal discourse changed with the advent of critical race theory
(“CRT”) in the late 1980s, following the development of feminist legal
theory in the prior decade.
Critical race theory is not a unified construct, but it does set forth four
core tenets.7 First, it posits that “race and racism are endemic to the
American normative order.”8 Second, it posits that legal structures are
“part of the social fabric . . . [which] constructs and produces race and race
relations . . . [in support of] white supremacy.”9 Third, it contends that the
construct of “colorblindness” in legal jurisprudence “ignores and cements
the racial caste system constructed in part by law,” and thus perpetuates
inequality for subordinated groups.10 Finally, CRT proponents advocate
that “[legal scholars should be] working toward a norm of ‘racial equality’
where different groups will not continue to suffer the oppression and
subordination they have suffered.”11
CRT can also be defined via its opposition to
at least three entrenched, mainstream beliefs about racial justice . . .
[one,] that blindness to race will eliminate racism . . . [two,] that racism
is a matter of individuals, not systems . . . [and three,] that one can fight
racism without . . . attention to sexism, homophobia, economic
exploitation, and other forms of injustice and oppression.12
5. See, e.g., Kim Forde-Marzrui, Learning Law Through the Lens of Race, 2 J.L.
& POL’Y 1, 4 (2005) (arguing that law should be integrated into all courses of a legal
curriculum because of the integral role that race had in the development,
administration, and consequences of the law).
6. Cynthia Grant Bowman et al., Race and Gender in the Law Review, 100 NW. U.
L. REV. 27, 56 (2006).
7. Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development and Future Directions of Critical
Race Theory and Related Scholarship, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 329, 333-34 (2006).
8. Id. at 333.
9. Id. at 334.
10. Id.; see also Neil A. Gotanda, A Critique of ‘Our Constitution is Color-Blind,’
in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 257
(1995) (theorizing, in a seminal work on CRT, that the “colorblind” paradigm of
constitutional law “fosters white racial domination” by maintaining the privileges held
by whites).
11. Rebecca Tsosie, Engaging the Spirit of Racial Healing Within Critical Race
Theory: An Exercise in Transformative Thought, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 21, 25 (2005).
12. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical
Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1766-67 (2003); Francisco Valdes et al., Battles
Waged, Won, and Lost: Critical Race Theory at the Turn of the Millennium, in
CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes et

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2008

3

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 2

368

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 16:3

Further, CRT advocates reject the use of “neutral” accounts of legal
decision-making and focus on the perspectives of subordinated peoples,
i.e., “voices from the bottom” of society.13 Finally, CRT embraces the use
of story-telling “to expose discrimination and illuminate how the law often
fails to account for the voices of outsiders.”14
CRT analysis has been applied to many diverse areas of law, including
antidiscrimination law, law and economics, and taxation.15 CRT has
spawned numerous theories of subordination within the law, including
Latina and Latino Critical Theory, Asian-American critical legal theory,
and Critical Race Feminism.16 Not surprisingly, CRT and its analogs have
come under harsh attack from conservatives in the legal academy.17 This is
expected since “conservative critics have long denounced feminism, as
well as other civil rights movements, for promoting victimization.”18
Given the breadth of its subject matter, it is unsurprising that divisions over
analytical approaches exist in the CRT movement.19
A. Intellectual Property, Innovation, and African-Americans
CRT analysis has “provided important insights into the ways in which
anti-discrimination law has not only failed to address, but [has] further
entrenched, ideological and thus material forms of discrimination.”20 An
al. eds., 2002).
13. See Bowman et al., supra note 6, at 60-61.
14. See Mario L. Barnes, Race, Sex, and Working Identities: Black Women’s
Stories and the Criminal Law: Restating the Power of Narrative, 29 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 941, 953-54 (2006) (arguing that many CRT theorists believe that a narrative is an
important form in which to construct analysis because traditional legal scholarship uses
the same narrative form to perpetuate racist norms); see also Pedro A. Malavet,
Literature and the Arts as Antisubordination Praxis: A Latcrit Theory and Cultural
Production: The Confessions of an Accidental Crit, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1293, 130102 (2000) (examining the use of narrative to combat an essentialism that threatens to
exclude minority viewpoints).
15. See Dorothy A. Brown, Race, Class and Gender Essentialism in Tax
Literature: The Joint Tax Return, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1469, 1489-90 (1997)
(discussing the need to examine tax law from a race as well as a gender perspective).
See generally Dorothy A. Brown, Fighting Racism in the Twenty-First Century, 61
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485 (2004) (examining the outgrowth of CRT into business
related areas of law such as tax, corporate law, and bankruptcy).
16. See Mutua, supra note 7, at 337-38.
17. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 382-84 (3d ed. 1996) (1995)
(engaging in a scathing critique of critical race and feminist methodology, and
highlighting the “pathologies” of black anti-Semitism and black criminality that critical
race scholars purportedly gloss over).
18. Martha T. McCluskey, Fear of Feminism: Media Stories of Feminist Victims
and Victims of Feminism on College Campuses, in FEMINISM, MEDIA & THE LAW 57
(Martha A. Fineman & Martha T. McCluskey eds., 1997).
19. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, Roll Over Beethoven: “A Critical
Examination of Recent Writing About Race,” 82 TEX. L. REV. 717 (2004).
20. Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Race Realism: Re-Claiming the Antidiscrimination
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insight that CRT offers to IP law is that its use in society and legal
scholarship, like antidiscrimination law, also may have served to entrench
material forms of discrimination. While individual black artists without
question have benefited from the IP system, the economic effects of IP
deprivation on the black community have been devastating. Intellectual
property today is perhaps the preeminent business asset.21 Analysts
recognize that blacks and other minorities in a market economy “cannot
participate as equals unless they too can deploy the private power generated
by ownership and control substantial business assets.”22
The three core protections of intellectual property at the federal level are
copyright, patent, and trademark law.23 Copyright law protects creative
output of authors, such as music composers, writers, and choreographers,
by granting limited property rights in their creations. Patent law provides
legal protection to inventors of useful inventions. Trademark law prohibits
the use of a valid trademark by third parties where the unauthorized use is
likely to cause consumer confusion in the marketplace.
In the past, few legal scholars examined race or gender in the context of
IP. It is only in recent years that scholarship exploring IP has examined it
in the context of social and historical inequality. Only recently have
scholars, such as Professor Sunder, recognized that IP serves not merely as
a legal doctrine allocating rights, but “as a legal vehicle for facilitating (or
thwarting) recognition of diverse contributors to social discourse.”24 IP
scholars such as Keith Aoki and Shubha Ghosh are now validating the
phenomena of the similar divestment of patent protection for black
inventors.25 My scholarship was among the first to show how the structure
of copyright law, and the phenomena of racial segregation and
discrimination, impacted the cultural production of African-Americans, and

Principle Through the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 66 U. PITT. L. REV.
455, 464 (2005).
21. See, e.g., David Kohler, Symposium, Foreword to Sony v. Universal: The
Betamax Decision Twenty Years Hence, 34 SW. U. L. REV. 151, 151 (2004) (remarking
that “technology and entertainment represent two of this country’s premier growth
industries,” and that these industries are founded on control over intellectual property).
22. See Robert E. Suggs, Poisoning the Well: Law & Economics and Racial
Inequality, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 255, 283 (2005) (contending that the wealth deriving
from “a thriving private sector and business class . . . would ameliorate many of the
persistent economic disparities” facing blacks).
23. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, Bankruptcy Treatment of Intellectual Property
Assets: An Economic Analysis, 22 BERK. TECH. L.J. 733, 735 (2007).
24. See Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 269 (2006).
25. See Keith Aoki, Distributive Justice and Intellectual Property: Distributive and
Syncretic Motives in Intellectual Property Law (with Special Reference to Coercion,
Agency, and Development), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 738-47 (2007) (noting that
slave owners often took credit for inventions by slaves). See generally Shubha Ghosh,
Globalization, Patents, and Traditional Knowledge, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 73 (2004).
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how the racially neutral construct of IP has adversely impacted AfricanAmerican artists.26
The long omission of an analysis of race in the IP context is glaring
given the tremendous innovative contributions of black authors and
inventors to society, and the salience of race “branding” in trademark law.
The treatment of blacks in the IP system has been characterized by two
dynamics that have import for racial and distributive justice. First, black
authors and inventors have found their works routinely appropriated and
divested. Second, appropriated and distorted creative works protected by
copyright, and trade symbols and imagery protected by trademark, have
promoted derogatory racial stereotypes that facilitate racial subordination.
B. Blacks and Copyright Law
At its core, IP in America “is understood almost exclusively as being
about incentives.”27 The history of blacks in the arts is one of unparalleled
innovation and creativity, especially in the realm of music and dance.
There has always been “an overwhelming prevalence of black innovators in
jazz,”28 as well as blues, ragtime, rock-and-roll, and today’s hip-hop music.
The history of black artists within U.S. IP law, however, has been one of
appropriation, degradation, and devaluation beginning with the creation of
the nation until the 1950s and ’60s. In the arena of music, there is no need
to assume mass appropriation and disparate treatment of black composers
and performers. Time after time, foundational artists who developed
ragtime, blues, and jazz found their copyrights divested, and through
inequitable contracts, their earnings pilfered.29 I argued elsewhere that for
a long period of U.S. history, the work of black blues artists was essentially
dedicated to the public domain.30 The public domain “can most broadly be
26. See generally K.J. Greene, Copyright, Culture and Black Music: A Legacy of
Unequal Protection, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 339 (1999) [hereinafter Greene,
Copyright]; K.J. Greene, What the Treatment of Black Artists Can Teach About
Copyright Law, in PETER K. YU, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH
ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 385 (2007).
27. See Sunder, supra note 24, at 257; see also ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL.,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 12 (2d ed. 2000) (noting
the primacy of incentive theory as underlying the basis of IP protections).
28. See FRANK KOFSKY, BLACK NATIONALISM AND THE REVOLUTION IN MUSIC 19
(1970) (contending that there have been more black innovators in the history of jazz on
any two instruments “than there have been whites on all instruments put together”).
29. The list of such artists is too long to constitute mere “anecdotal” evidence, and
includes artists from Scott Joplin to Huddie Lebetter to Jelly Roll Morton. See TERRY
WALDO, THIS IS RAGTIME (1976); CHARLES WOLFE & KIP LORNELL, THE LIFE AND
LEGEND OF LEADBELLY (1992); HOWARD REICH & WILLIAM GAINES, JELLY’S BLUES:
THE LIFE, MUSIC AND REDEMPTION OF JELLY ROLL MORTON (2003). See generally K.J.
Greene, “Copynorms,” Black Cultural Production and the Debate Over AfricanAmerican Reparations, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1179 (2008).
30. See Greene, Copyright, supra note 26, at 356 (arguing that blacks received less
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defined as ‘material that is unprotected by intellectual property rights,
either as a whole or in a particular context, and is thus “free” for all to
use.’”31
Similarly, it has been argued that with respect to black artists “copyright
law . . . was created without deference to the interests of large segments of
society,” including women and minorities.32 Indeed, my previous work
demonstrates that five copyright structures disadvantaged black cultural
production.
First, the idea/expression dichotomy of copyright law prohibits copyright
protection for raw ideas, and protects only expression of ideas. I contend
that this standard provided less protection to innovative black composers,
whose ground-breaking work was imitated so widely that it became the
“idea” and thus impossible to protect.
Second, copyright’s fixation standard provides that copyright protection
extends only to a work that is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression.33
However, a key component of black cultural production is improvisation.
As a result, fixation deeply disadvantages African-American modes of
cultural production, which are derived from an oral tradition and communal
standards.34
Third, copyright law sets forth a minimal standard of originality, which
does not protect innovation, and in fact encourages imitation. Fourth,
copyright formalities, until 1976, put copyright protection out of reach of
the illiterate or semi-literate creators of the blues.35 Finally, there is a
protections over IP rights due to “inequalities of bargaining power, the clash between
the structural elements of copyright law and the oral predicate of black culture, and
broad and pervasive social discrimination).
31. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a
Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 49 (2004).
32. See Greene, Copyright, supra note 26, at 356.
33. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2007) (stating the categories of works that qualify for
copyright protection, including literary works, musical works, and accompanying
words, sound recordings, etc.).
34. See id. (articulating that copyright protection does not extend to ideas or other
types of intangible innovations, regardless of the form in which they are described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in a work); see also KEMBREW MCLEOD, OWNING
CULTURE: AUTHORSHIP, OWNERSHIP AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 71 (2001)
(contending that “African-American culture comes out of a primarily oral culture . . .
[and] intertextual practices that characterize many aspects of African-American cultural
production conflict” with intellectual property law); SIVA VYAIDNATHAN, COPYRIGHT
AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS
CREATIVITY (2001) (arguing that, although ownership in the blues tradition differs
significantly from the European model, there is a real and significant claim to
originality in the performance-oriented world of the blues).
35. See, e.g., Sara K. Stadler, Incentive and Expectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGS
L.J. 433, 471 (2007) (explaining that, prior to the 1976 Copyright Act, failure to
comply with copyright formalities of registration, affixation of notice of copyright, and
deposit resulted in forfeiture of copyright).
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general absence of moral rights protection, which protects against harms to
authorial dignity. The fact that black artists continued to create and
innovate, even in the face of diminished economic incentives, poses a
challenge to copyright policy, which dictates that copyright “is
fundamentally about providing a balance of incentives for authors.”36 This
phenomenon surely gives weight to the notion that economic incentives
alone are not the sole motivator of creative output.
Larry Lessig, a leading IP scholar, asserted that the “record industry was
born of . . . piracy.”37 Lessig contends that the “law governing recordings
gives artists less . . . by giving artists a weaker right than it otherwise gives
creative authors.”38 Lessig was referring to the compulsory license
provision of the 1909 Copyright Act, which permits anyone to re-record a
composition that has been released to the public via sound recording.39
However, beneath Professor Lessig’s analysis lies a much more insidious
form of piracy. The early music industry was built on the back of black
cultural production from the era of slave songs and spirituals to the period
of black-face minstrelsy—America’s most popular and profitable form of
entertainment from 1800 to the end of the last century.40 Minstrelsy “was
the first truly American contribution to the history of stage entertainment,
and it owed its very existence to the Negro [sic].”41 Minstrelsy defamed
blacks, and other minorities, in stereotypical and derogatory ways.42
Then came ragtime and blues, which single-handedly carried the
36. See Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 228
(2004).
37. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY
AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 55 (2004)
(contending that even the advent of the first recording technology presented new
problems in law surrounding composers’ rights to their creations, and the music
industry’s right to reproduce them).
38. See id. at 57 (asserting that Congress’s motivation for giving writers and other
artists more control over their creations than any musician over their songs is the fear
of stifling creativity and the desire to give the public access to a wider range of music).
39. See id. at 57-58 (noting that, while the public and the recording companies
benefit from limitations on musical rights, the musicians themselves lose).
40. See WALDO, supra note 29, at 12 (noting that stereotypical images of the
“happy-go-lucky, wide-grinnin’, chicken-stealin’, razor-toting darky” became deeply
embedded in the social conscience of white America during the minstrel period). The
minstrel show was central to American culture from the 1830s to the 1870s, so much so
that it is “difficult for us now to realize how all-pervasive and influential the minstrel
show was.” Id.
41. See JAMES HASKINS, BLACK MUSIC IN AMERICA: A HISTORY THROUGH ITS
PEOPLE 21 (1987).
42. See Keith Aoki, “Foreign-ness” and Asian American Identities: Yellowface,
World War II Propaganda, and Bifurcated Racial Stereotypes, 4 UCLA ASIAN PAC.
AM. L.J. 1, 21-22 (1996) (analyzing how minstrelsy defamed Asian Americans and
noting that the prevalence of white actors in Yellowface helped to reinforce the
segregation of Chinese immigrants).
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recording industry from the 1920s until the Great Depression. Although
ragtime music was innovated by black composers such as Scott Joplin, and
served as “the most popular ‘pop’ style [for twenty years],” it was white
composers such as Irving Berlin who reaped the greatest financial
rewards.43 The line between permissible “borrowing” and impermissible
appropriation may be dim at times, but there is strong evidence that the
works of black artists were plagiarized and appropriated extensively.44
Furthermore, the routine stereotyping that occurred concurrently with
copyright appropriation negatively impacted black artists’ personality
rights. It has been said that the creative process “implicates the honor,
dignity, and artistic spirit of the author in a fundamentally personal way.”45
From this perspective, black artists also were subject to deprivation of the
moral rights of integrity and attribution.
With some irony, one of the most successful white bands of the early
twentieth century, the Original Dixieland Jazz Band, took New Orleans
Negro music and reduced it to a “simplified formula . . . the kind of
compressed, rigid format that could appeal to a mass audience.”46 This
cultural appropriation of black art set a long-standing pattern wherein
“large financial gains were made by white musicians playing black music
to essentially white audiences.”47
Similar patterns of innovation by blacks, followed by imitation by
whites, preceded rock-and-roll, a derivation of the blues, and on to today’s
hip-hop, where white rappers such as Vanilla Ice and more recently
Eminem gross top sales.48 It has been said that the “exploitation of the
43. See NELSON GEORGE, THE DEATH OF RHYTHM AND BLUES 8 (1988).
44. See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Copyright on Catfish Row: Musical Borrowing,

Porgy and Bess, and Unfair Use, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 277, 305-09 (2006) (exploring the
lines between borrowing and appropriation, for example, by noting that famed
composer George Gershwin “borrowed” heavily from African-American cultural
expression, and was even accused of stealing the piece “I Got Rhythm” from the
classically trained African-American composer William Grant Still).
45. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Attribution Right in the United States:
Caught in the Crossfire Between Copyright and Section 43(A), 77 WASH. L. REV. 985,
986 (2002) (arguing that the framework for moral rights in a creation draws out of the
artist or author’s infusion of the self into their work).
46. See GUNTHER SCHULLER, EARLY JAZZ: ITS ROOTS AND MUSICAL DEVELOPMENT
179-80 (1968) (articulating that by substituting an unsubtle, rhythmic drive for the
expressive power and improvisation notable of the best African-American bands of the
time, the Original Dixieland Jazz Band found the formula for mass appeal).
47. See BEN SIDRAN, BLACK TALK: HOW THE MUSIC OF BLACK AMERICA CREATED
A RADICAL ALTERNATIVE TO THE VALUES OF WESTERN LITERARY TRADITION 50-51
(1971) (noting that the Original Dixieland Band “made the first jazz recordings that
sold millions of copies”).
48. See CHARLES GILLET, THE SOUND OF THE CITY: THE RISE OF ROCK AND ROLL
189 (Outerbridge & Dienstfrey ed., 1970) (1996) (analyzing the role of race in the
production of rock-and-roll, and explaining that rhythm and blues hits were
increasingly recorded by white singers by the late 1950s, losing much of their style and
substance along the way).
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author is coded deep within the copyright system.”49 By any measurement,
the treatment of black artists vis-à-vis white artists is striking in the nonreciprocal nature of the appropriation, and the imposition of vicious
dignitary harm to blacks as a group through negative cultural stereotyping.
C. Blacks and Trademark Law
At first blush, as Alex Johnson, Jr. has remarked, “the law of trademarks
would seem to have little to do with issues of race and racial
identification.”50 Trademark law provides protection to trademark owners
against unauthorized use of their own or a similar mark, when it is likely to
lead to consumer confusion.51 On closer examination, however, Johnson
demonstrated that “the principles of trademark law provide surprising
insight into the formation of dichotomous racial classifications in the
United States.”52 Trademark law is inextricably tied to advertising and
marketing. As Desiree Kennedy pointed out, advertising “is an important
means of public discourse . . . [and] . . . is instrumental in affecting
viewers’ perceptions of their world and their interactions with others.”53
Further, Lew Gibbons noted, modern trademarks play a large role in
shaping “individual and group social identity.”54
The history of
advertising, and the role of trademarks therein, is one rife with stereotypical
images.55
49. See Dan Hunter, Culture War, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1105, 1125 (2005) (asserting
that artists and creators have been dependant upon sheer generosity for much of
recorded history).
50. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Destabilizing Racial Classifications Based on
Insights Gleaned from Trademark Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 887, 906 (1996) (asserting that
by providing uniform quality and economizing on consumer search costs, trademark
law makes implicit assumptions about the identity of the unknown consumer).
51. See, e.g., K.J. Greene, Abusive Trademark Litigation and the Incredible
Shrinking Confusion Doctrine, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 609, 620 (2004)
(explaining that trademark law prohibits the use of marks similar or identical to
registered trademarks only when they are used by a potential competitor or producer of
similar goods or services).
52. See Johnson, supra note 50, at 906 (asserting that the principals of trademark
law, though having seemingly little to do with race, operate in a fashion similar to
racial identification).
53. See Deseriee A. Kennedy, Marketing Goods, Marketing Images: The Impact of
Advertising on Race, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 615, 615-17 (2000) (asserting that advertising is
highly important in shaping common perceptions of societal norms, roles, and
hierarchies).
54. See Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Semiotics of the Scandalous and Immoral and
the Disparaging: Section 2(A) Trademark Law After Lawrence v. Texas, 9 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 187, 196 (2005) (rejecting a law and economics approach to
“queer” marks and re-appropriation of negatively stereotyping trademarks by outsider
groups such as gays and minorities).
55. See Ross D. Petty et al., Regulating Target Marketing and Other Race-based
Advertising Practices, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 335, 347-49 (2003) (listing various
examples of overtly racist advertisements, such as those that stated they would only be
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Trademarks used in advertising can impact more than just commercial
transactions; media images “are frequently the predominant source of
information many have about people of color.”56 In the same way that
“coon” music in early America reflected derogatory anti-black stereotypes,
so did trade symbols used to sell products. Historically, trademarks and
symbols almost perfectly replicated cultural stereotypes about black men
and women. From Sambo and Ratus, the grinning chef on the box of
Cream of Wheat cereal, to Uncle Ben and Aunt Jemima, trademark law
essentially legalized and promoted the use of stereotypical representations
of blacks and other minorities. Additionally, it has been said that
“twentieth century white identity was forged in the crucible of Jim Crow
iconography, including Aunt Jemima, Uncle Ben, and blackface
minstrels.”57 These idyllic southern stereotypes of the smiling, happy black
domestic servant could be seen as “myths [that] masked the ugly violence
of lynching, disenfranchisement and segregation.”58
In the case of black men, history shows the durability of three stock
prototypes: the “Tom” character, the “Coon” character, and the “Buck”
character.59 “The Tom caricature portrays Black men as faithful, happy,
submissive servants.”60 An example of this in trademark law is Uncle Ben,
the elderly black man used to sell rice. He is comforting, non-threatening,
de-sexualized, and there to serve whites.
The Coon character, in contrast, is lazy, shiftless, and unintelligent, yet
cunning in obtaining vices he enjoys.61 Amos ‘n’ Andy, examples of Coon
characters, were characters created for a radio show in 1928 that went on to
“become one the country’s most popular radio programs.”62 The characters
were black, but initially played by whites—the show’s creators—on the
sold to whites, to advertisements based on racial stereotypes, such as Crazy Horse Malt
Liquor).
56. See id.
57. See Arela Gross, Beyond Black and White: Cultural Approaches to Race and
Slavery, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 640, 675 (2001) (asserting that these stereotypes were
born in part out of whites’ efforts to keep newly freed slaves “in their place”).
58. See id. (noting, in addition, that the increasing violence of male white
supremacists was compounded by the growing assertiveness of white women).
59. See generally DONALD BOGLE, TOMS, COONS, MULATTOES, MAMMIES &
BUCKS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF BLACKS IN AMERICAN FILMS (Viking Press
1973).
60. David
Pilgrim, The Caricatures - Golliwoggz!, Dec. 2000,
http://golliwogg.wordpress.com/the-caricatures (explaining that the Tom caricature
endeared himself to whites by being dependable, selfless, and psychologically
dependent on whites for approval).
61. See id. (noting that the Coon character was the most insulting of the anti-black
caricatures, portraying blacks as lazy, stupid, childish, and morally wanting).
62. See Silverman v. CBS Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1989) (analyzing whether,
after over twenty years of disuse, CBS effectively had abandoned copyright ownership
of the Amos ‘n’ Andy characters and series).
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radio, who posed in blackface for publicity photos. When the show went to
television in 1951, black actors took over in the lead roles. Amos ‘n’ Andy
was protected by both copyright and trademark. In the 1980s trademark
litigation ensued over whether CBS, which had discontinued the show in
the 1960s after protests by civil rights advocates, abandoned and therefore
lost legal rights in the Amos ‘n’ Andy mark.63
Similarly, Sambo’s Restaurants used the symbol of a smiling Coon-type
character to sell food products for over sixty years. “Little Black Sambo”
was a literary character that “has long been a part of the American culture,”
dating back to a 1781 play “where the black male Sambo character, played
by a white actor in blackface, ‘danced, sang, spoke nonsense, and acted the
buffoon.’”64 After numerous complaints from civil rights activists and
lawsuits by municipalities seeking to prevent expansion, Sambo’s
Restaurants changed its name to “Sam’s” in 1989.65
The Buck character is a brute, and could represent the worst fears of
early white America—that of the hyper-sexual black male intent on getting
access to white women’s sexuality.66 The Buck character surfaces in
political marketing, a fairly recent incarnation, being the “infamous
television spot from the 1988 presidential campaign” of George Bush, Sr.,
featuring released criminal Willie Horton.67
Stereotypes with roots in trademarks have stigmatized African-American
women. It has been noted that “American history is replete with ‘slaverooted’ images of African-American womanhood.”68 Three negative
stereotypes exist regarding black women: the “Aunt Jemima” type, a
domestic servant; the “Mammy” type, a typically domineering, matriarchal

63. See id. at 51 (finding that CBS still held rights to the post-1948 radio scripts,
but that those prior were in the public domain).
64. See Ronald Turner, “Little Black Sambo,” Images and Perceptions: Professor
Cohen’s Critique of Professor Lawrence, 12 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 131, 140
(1995).
65. See, e.g., Sambo’s Restaurants Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686, 695
(6th Cir. 1981) (holding that the name “Sambo,” while offensive to blacks, was
commercial speech protected under the First Amendment).
66. See, e.g., Jon Hanson & Kathleen Hanson, The Blame Frame: Justifying
(Racial) Injustice in America, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 437-38 (2006) (noting
that the brute caricature served to legitimize slavery and Jim Crow by providing a
compelling case for segregation and the suppression of black men to protect white
women).
67. See, e.g., Terry Smith, Race and Money in Politics, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1469, 1487
(2001) (asserting that Republicans’ motivations in choosing Horton were influenced by
the fact that his crime was particularly frightening to many of their constituency—that
of a black male raping a white woman).
68. See, e.g., Lori A. Tribbett-Williams, Saying Nothing, Talking Loud: Lil’ Kim
and Foxy Brown, Caricatures of African-American Womanhood, 10 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN’S STUD. 167, 169-70 (2000).
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figure; and the “Jezebel” type, a highly amoral, sexualized representation.69
Trademark law derives its authority at the federal level from the Lanham
Act of 1946. The Lanham Act prohibits the trademarked use of racially
derogatory images, but limits the trademark registration of such images
under Section Two, part of which prohibits the registration of a mark that
consists of or comprises “scandalous” or “immoral” matter.70 Further,
trademark law prohibits the registration of trademarks that may
disparage—i.e., bring into contempt or disrepute—living or dead persons,
institutions, beliefs, or national symbols.71 In recent years, groups
including Native Americans and African-Americans used Section Two of
the Lanham Act to cancel the registration of racially offensive trademarks.
In today’s marketplace, scholars note that “explicit racial discrimination
is rare in commercial advertising,” but subtle forms of stereotyping still
persist.72 Professor Rosemary Coombe has noted that stereotypes of Native
Americans in advertising are particularly entrenched.73 African-American
trademarks, however, such as Uncle Ben and Aunt Jemima have received
makeovers in recent years to remove stereotypical associations. Despite
commercial changes, racist groups on the internet still use stereotypical
commentary to link blacks to consumption of Kentucky Fried Chicken.
Some blacks have even attempted to trademark derogatory terms such as
“nigga.”74
One of the ironies of minstrelsy, which inculcated stereotypes that persist
to this day, was that it provided the first opportunities for black artists and
performers, especially black women.75 Black women from slavery until
well into the twentieth century were characterized in popular culture and
69. See id. (describing the fourth stereotype, the “tragic mulatto,” as being of two
races and accepted by neither); see also PATRICIA MORTON, DISFIGURED IMAGES: THE
HISTORICAL ASSAULT ON AFRO-AMERICAN WOMEN xi, xiv (1991).
70. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2000); Stephen R. Baird, Moral Intervention in the
Trademark Arena: Banning the Registration of Scandalous or Immoral Trademarks, 83
TRADEMARK REP. 661, 663 (1993).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2000); Baird, supra note 70, at 730-31.
72. See Petty et al., supra note 55, at 348 (noting that “implied and inferential
racial messages” persist).
73. See Rosemary Coombe, Marking Difference in American Commerce:
Trademarks and Alertity at Century’s End, 19 POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV.
105, 111 (1996) (remarking on the persistence of negative stereotyping in advertising
of such brands as RED MAN tobacco, BRAVES, and REDSKINS for sports teams,
among others).
74. See Brenda Porter, ‘N’ Word Means Divide and Conquer, BLACK ENTERPRISE,
May 1, 2007 (recounting the failed attempt by comedian Damon Wayans to patent the
word “nigga” for a clothing line and remarking that the website “niggaspace.com” is an
online social website for African-Americans).
75. See ROSALYN M. SCOTT, AND SO I SING: AFRICAN-AMERICAN DIVAS OF OPERA
AND CONCERT 14-15 (1990) (noting that African-Americans gained theatrical
experience and financial advantages through minstrelsy).
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literature “by the stereotypical images of [either] the ham-fisted matriarch
[or] the amoral, instinctual slut.”76 The “unifying theme underlying
[stereotypes of black women] is one of deviance and worthlessness . . . .”77
Media defined black women as Mammies, Jezebels, Aunt Jemimas,
Sapphires, and welfare queens.78
II. THE EMERGING FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF INTELLECUAL PROPERTY
The impact of both gender and race in IP has been under-explored until
recent years. IP scholars such as Dan Burk have noted the rarity of
“[f]ocused critical examination of pervasive biases of the intellectual
property system . . . .”79 The feminist critique of IP is still in its early
stages, but it provides a good foundation for the analysis of the ways that a
seemingly “gender-neutral” regime, such as IP, can in fact reinforce social
domination. IP, in the form of film, theatre, music, and literature provides
the raw material for popular culture, and feminist scholars such as Susan
Bisom-Rap have noted that “[p]opular culture is a fertile analytical site for
feminist legal theory.”80
A great strength of feminist legal theory is its focus on uncovering
subordination hidden in “neutral” legal regulations.81 Professor Coombe,
for example, has recognized that “[i]ntellectual property law does not
function simply in a rule-like fashion, nor is it merely a regime of rights
and obligations.”82 Rather, it exists in a cultural battleground of hegemony,
social dominance, and resistance. A feminist critique recognizes that rights
governing cultural production did not arise in a social or cultural vacuum,
but in a crucible of gender and racial subordination, the embers of which
76. See Sherely Anne Williams, Foreword to ZORA NEALE HURSTON, THEIR EYES
WERE WATCHING GOD, at vii (Univ. of Ill. Press 1978) (1937).
77. See Margaret M. Russell, Law and Racial Legal Reelism: Black Women as
Celluloid “Legal” Heroines, in MARTHA A. FINEMAN & MARTHA T. MCCLUSKEY,
FEMINISM, MEDIA AND THE LAW 136 (1997).
78. See, e.g., Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bathwater, Racial
Imagery and Stereotypes: The African-American Woman and the Battered Woman
Syndrome, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1003, 1049-50 (describing the effect of these caricatures
as marginalizing African-American women).
79. See Dan L. Burk, Feminism and Dualism in Intellectual Property, 15 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 183, 186 (2007) (noting that patterns of subordination in
women’s work “appear to hold true in our system for rewarding innovation and
creativity”).
80. See Susan Bisom-Rap, Introduction to MARTHA A. FINEMAN & MARTHA T.
MCCLUSKEY, FEMINISM, MEDIA AND THE LAW 87, 89 (1997) (noting that feminists seek
to gain greater influence over the gender messages deployed in popular culture).
81. See NANCY LEVIT & ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: A
PRIMER 45-56 (2006) (noting that legal feminist methodology focuses on uncovering
“male biases hidden beneath supposedly ‘neutral’ laws”).
82. Rosemary J. Coombe, Critical Cultural Studies, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 463,
481 (1998).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol16/iss3/2

14

Greene: Intellectual Property at the Intersection of Race and Gender: Lad

2008]

IP AT THE INTERSECTION OF RACE AND GENDER

379

still burn today. Authorship, after all “is the foundation of copyright,”83
and authorship, like race and gender, is socially constructed.
Some analytical commonalities exist between feminist critiques of IP
and those that seek to expose racial subordination in the IP context. This
Article seeks to illustrate that there is an invisible—in an Ellsonian sense—
dynamic of subordination that underlies the “race-neutral” regime of IP. In
a similar vein, IP scholars using a feminist paradigm have noted that
“intellectual property appears to have been largely overlooked in feminist
critiques of the law . . . .”84 Similarly, feminist scholars have recognized
that IP scholarship, in the words of Sonia Katyal, has traditionally “failed
to consider how intellectual property, as it is owned, constituted, created,
and enforced, both benefits and disadvantages segments of the population
in divergent ways.”85
Gender perspectives on IP can help inform issues of race and reform, and
vice versa. Racial critiques of IP, like feminist critiques, can provide
“insight into the power, social structures, and theory that would otherwise
be missing . . . [and can] give[] us a different way of looking at the
world.”86 Feminist IP scholars have noted that copyright laws from their
inception
were written by men to embody a male vision of the ways in which
creativity and commerce should intersect . . . [w]hether this model of
copyright serves women as well as men has not been a primary
consideration of policy makers, if it has even been contemplated at all.87

Similarly, scholars such as Rebecca Tushnet, examining IP through the
lens of gender, have noted that “when we compare fields that get
intellectual property protection (software, sculpture) with fields that do not
(fashion, cooking, sewing) it becomes uncomfortably obvious that our
cultural policy has expected women’s endeavors to generate surplus
creativity but has assumed that men’s endeavors require
compensation . . . .”88

83. Carys J. Craig, Reconstructing the Author-Self: Some Feminist Lessons for
Copyright Law, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 207, 209 (2007).
84. Dan L. Burk, Copyright and Feminism in Digital Media, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL’Y & L. 519, 521 (2006).
85. Sonia K. Katyal, Performance, Property and the Slashing of Gender in Fan
Fiction, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 461, 462 (2006).
86. See Debora Halbert, Feminist Interpretations of Intellectual Property, 14 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 431, 432 (2006) (“[T]he issue of copyright has not been
considered a feminist issue . . . .”).
87. Ann Bartow, Fair Use and the Fairer Sex: Gender, Feminism, and Copyright
Law, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 551, 557 (2006).
88. Rebecca Tushnet, My Fair Ladies: Sex, Gender and Fair Use in Copyright, 15
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 273, 303-04 (2007).
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A. African-American Women and IP
Throughout U.S. history, black women have borne the unique burden of
being subordinated based on both race and gender.89 Intersectionality
theory, an off-shoot of critical race feminism, posits that “black women are
subordinated in ways not predicted by the lowest common denominator
experiences of just blacks or just women.”90 Critical race feminists “have
highlighted the failure of mainstream civil rights and feminist paradigms
alike to see the intersection of racism and sexism in hierarchies of power
and in the experiences of women of color.”91 Scholars examining race
through a critical race feminist lens contend that “[b]lack women
experience a special kind of oppression . . . because of their dual racial and
gender identity and their limited access to economic resources . . . .”92 For
example, an examination of black women involved in the criminal justice
system in late eighteenth through the early twentieth centuries shows that
black women had higher arrest rates, received longer sentences, and were
“less likely to be pardoned, paroled or put on probation than were [white]
females.”93 However, black feminist scholars also note that AfricanAmerican women and other women of color are multi-dimensional and
have “some race issues in common with men of color, some gender issues
in common with white females, and some separate issues and identities.”94
Catherine MacKinnon, a leading feminist scholar, contended that
“women have a history [and] . . . create culture . . . .”95 In the case of black
women, the contributions to art and culture have been titanic. African89. Cf. Sumi K. Cho, Converging Stereotypes in Racialized Sexual Harassment:
Where the Model Minority Meets Suzie Wong, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 177, 181
(1997) (remarking on the dual subordination faced by other women of color such as
Asian women and positing a theory of “racialized (hetero)sexual harassment” regarding
Asian women).
90. See Frank Rudy Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity: Intersectionality,
Assimilation, Identity Performance, and Hierarchy, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 853, 856,
861 (2006) (postulating that women of color are “denigrated within more than one
major system of oppression”).
91. Cynthia Grant Bowman et al., supra note 6, at 65.
92. Jewel Amoah, Narrative: The Road to Black Feminist Theory, 12 BERKELEY
WOMEN’S L.J. 84, 99 (1997); see BEVERLY GUY-SHEFTALL, INTRODUCTION TO WORDS
OF FIRE: AN ANTHOLOGY OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN FEMINIST THOUGHT 2 (Beverly GuySheftall ed., 1995).
93. See, e.g., Anne M. Butler, Still in Chains: Black Women in Western Prisons,
1865-1910, in MONROE LEE BILLINGTON & ROGER D. HARDAWAY, AFRICANAMERICANS ON THE WESTERN FRONTIER 191-92 (1998).
94. Angela Mae Kupenda, For White Women: Your Blues Ain’t Like Mine, but We
All Hide Our Faces and Cry–Literary Illumination for White and Black Sister/Friends,
22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 67, 71 (2002).
95. CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
LAW 39 (1987) (positing that women “not only have been excluded from making what
has been considered art; our artifacts have been excluded from setting the standards by
which art is art”).
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American women in essence launched the modern recording industry with
the advent of blues. A singer named Mamie Smith recorded a song in 1920
that sold 75,000 copies in one month and one million copies within one
year.96 Music historians recognize that “the early 1920’s was the golden
era of the black female blues singer.”97
Scholars note that “the great classic blues singers were women.”98 More
than three-quarters of formal blues were “written from a woman’s point of
view.”99 Thus it was women blues singers and their lyrics “who first
brought blues into general notice in the United States.”100 History shows
that the great blues singers, such as Bessie Smith and Ma Rainey, were
swindled out of copyrights to compositions and subject to disparate
treatment in segregated “race record” divisions of major record
companies.101 Bessie Smith, recognized as the greatest of blues singers,
sold close to ten million records over the course of her career, but was
duped of copyrights in compositions and royalties for record sales by
record industry executives and managers.102 Similarly, Ma Rainey, who
composed most of the songs she recorded, “like most black musicians . . .
was paid a flat fee for recording sessions, and she never received royalties”
for copyrighted compositions.103 Yet after the great blues singers of the
early 1920s, black women virtually disappeared from sight in the
emergence of ragtime and jazz, genres dominated by men, to such an
extreme that books on the history of jazz overlook women artists, save
perhaps references to Billy Holiday and Ella Fitzgerald.104

96. See TED GIOIA, THE HISTORY OF JAZZ 17 (1997) (noting that “[i]n 1926 alone,
more than three hundred blues and gospel recordings were released . . . most of them
featuring black female vocalists”).
97. EILEEN SOUTHERN, THE MUSIC OF BLACK AMERICANS: A HISTORY 371 (3d ed.
1997).
98. LEROI JONES, BLUES PEOPLE: THE NEGRO EXPERIENCE IN WHITE AMERICA AND
THE MUSIC THAT DEVELOPED FROM IT 91 (1963).
99. Id.
100. See id. (noting that the majority of country blues singers were almost all men).
101. See Greene, supra note 29 (explaining that in 1979, Bessie Smith’s heirs
unsuccessfully filed suit against Columbia records alleging that Columbia paid Smith a
flat-fee per song basis with no record royalties, and registered Smith’s compositions in
the record company’s name, thus denying Smith her copyright royalties).
102. See, e.g., AFRICAN-AMERICAN LIVES 779 (Henry Louis Gates & Evelyn Brooks
Higginbotham eds., 2004) (commenting that in 1931 Columbia Records dropped
Bessie Smith as an artist and her record sales dramatically declined).
103. See BLACK WOMEN IN AMERICA: A HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 959-60
(Darlene Clark ed., 1993).
104. See, e.g., ROY CARR, A CENTURY OF JAZZ: FROM BLUES TO BOB, SWING, AND
HIP-Hop (1997).
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III. TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE/INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
“Critical” perspectives in the context of international IP law are now
emerging.105 Taking up the challenge to apply the lens of critical race and
other “critical theories,”106 scholars such as Margaret Chon contend that
globalization and the gap between rich and developing nations of the
former colonial period in conjunction with IP have “injected human rights
and social justice debate into a field dominated by commercial
instrumentalism and economic rationales . . . .”107
The debate over
traditional knowledge reflects tensions between the developed world and
the Third World over culture and control of resources.108 Scholars such as
Peter Yu explore the connection between IP and human rights.109 Angela
Riley urges making distinctions between IP rights that further the interest
of a mere few but dominant entities, for example the Walt Disney
Corporation, “and those that are designed to put indigenous peoples on
equal footing with other actors in the global market.”110
The debate over traditional knowledge, indigenous peoples and IP
appropriation can provide insight into the dynamic of African-American
cultural appropriation. While African-Americans are not an “indigenous”
people to North America, many commonalties exist between the treatment
of early blues artists and native peoples.111 In the area of traditional
105. See, e.g., William J. Aceves, Critical Jurisprudence and International Legal
Scholarship: A Study of Equitable Distribution, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 299, 392
(2001) (examining the international legal regime through the lens of critical
jurisprudence and arguing that facets of international norms and rules marginalize and
subordinate countless groups of people).
106. See Penelope E. Andrews, Making Room for Critical Race Theory in
International Law: Some Practical Pointers, 45 VILL. L. REV. 855, 872-75 (2000)
(arguing that two dominant features of critical race theory are the narratives of
individuals and its lack of programs).
107. See Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 2821, 2825 (2006) (indicating that analysis of the intersection of
intellectual property and development is absent larger guiding principles that address
the central concerns of development).
108. See Ghosh, supra note 25, at 76 (highlighting the difference between the
traditional knowledge debate and debates over the expansion of intellectual property in
the areas of academic culture and the internet).
109. See Peter K. Yu, International Rights Approaches to Intellectual Property:
Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests In a Human Rights Framework, 40
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1039 (2007) (proposing that protecting human rights obligations is
more important than the non-human rights aspects of intellectual property protections).
110. See Angela R. Riley, Indigenous Peoples and Emerging Protections for
Traditional Knowledge, in 4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH:
ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 373, 383 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007)
(indicating that balanced and fair protection of TK will not provide indigenous groups
with additional rights, but instead put them on the same level as other creators).
111. See David E. Wilkins, African Americans and Aboriginal Peoples: Similarities
and Differences in Historical Experiences, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 515, 530 (2005)

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol16/iss3/2

18

Greene: Intellectual Property at the Intersection of Race and Gender: Lad

2008]

IP AT THE INTERSECTION OF RACE AND GENDER

383

knowledge (“TK”), asymmetries of power between the developed and the
colonial or developing world in the nineteenth century “led to certain types
of knowledge that were concentrated in the Third World as essentially
being deemed public domain resources that were freely appropriable.”112
Although no single definition of TK exists, it has been described as
“indigenous and local community knowledge, innovations, and
practices . . . often collectively owned and transmitted orally from
generation to generation.”113 As Paul Kuruk has noted, the group-focused,
collective nature of TK makes it difficult to protect under traditional IP law
norms.114
Christine Haight Farley was one of the first scholars to analyze the
disadvantages IP imposed on traditional knowledge and indigenous
peoples.115 Professor Farley noted that indigenous people in recent decades
have attempted to use IP law “to protect their cultural heritage from
external poaching.”116 Traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples, like
the works of early black blues artists, has presented challenges to IP
protection, and often for the same reasons.
(exploring similarities between indigenous peoples, such as Native Americans and
African-Americans, and noting that both Native Americans and blacks historically have
endured a similar lack of rights, even though the law has treated each group quite
differently); see also Howard J. Vogel, Reframing Rights from the Ground Up: The
Contribution of the New U.N. Law of Self-Determination to Recovering the Principle of
Sociability on the Way to a Relational Theory of International Human Rights, 20 TEMP.
INT’L & COMP. L.J. 443, 459 (2006) (contending that African-Americans may qualify
as a “minority people” under international human rights law).
112. See, e.g., ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION AND THE LAW 209 (1998) (noting that
western categories of intellectual property “divide peoples and things according to the
same colonizing discourses of possessive individualism that historically disentitled and
disenfranchised Native peoples in North America”); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, TRIPS
and Traditional Knowledge: Local Communities, Local Knowledge, and Global
Intellectual Property Frameworks, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 155, 163 (2006)
(explaining that the global intellectual property system that developed at the end of the
nineteenth century was based on existing national intellectual property systems and
bilateral agreements between countries).
113. See, e.g., Bryan Bachner, Facing the Music: Traditional Knowledge and
Copyright, 12 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 9, 9 (2005) (noting that TK can include forms of
stories, songs, folklore, proverbs, cultural values, rituals, local languages, agricultural
practices, and medical resources).
114. See Paul Kuruk, The Role of Customary Law Under Sui Generis Frameworks
of Intellectual Property Rights in Traditional and Indigenous Knowledge, 17 IND. INT’L
& COMP. L. REV. 67, 72 (2007) (stating that another problem with IP laws and
indigenous knowledge is IP laws only offer protection for fixed periods of time and not
an indeterminate period necessary to protect indigenous knowledge).
115. See Christine Haight Farley, Protecting Folklore of Indigenous Peoples: Is
Intellectual Property the Answer?, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1997) (concluding that the
current IP system is well-suited for those who want to disseminate their art, but not for
those who want to prevent outside use of their art).
116. See id. at 13 (claiming that indigenous groups want control over their art so that
they can use mass media imagery to communicate their cultural identity to the outside
world).
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As Professor Farley noted, the fixation requirement of copyright, for
example, can constitute a barrier to protection because folklore and
traditional knowledge “may never be recorded in any tangible form.”117
Traditional knowledge, such as folklore, has existed “beyond the reach of
conventional IP models of ownership and moral rights.”118 Daniel Gervais
has provided three main areas in which IP has been incompatible with TK
protection.119 One, TK has been under-protected because it is too old and
therefore in the public domain.120 Two, TK does not qualify for IP
protection because the author of the material cannot be identified.121 Three,
TK is often created by large, diffused groups, whereas western IP
paradigms are based on creation by individuals.122 In contrast, aboriginal
or indigenous cultures seek to protect cultural resources “in the name of the
relevant community.”123
Analysts in the TK arena assert that the cultural appropriation of
indigenous people’s works “causes cultural devastation” and reinforces
systems of subordination used to oppress native groups.124 The harm of
appropriation in the TK context is exacerbated “because of the spiritual or
sacred element in much indigenous, creative material.”125
Just as blues men and women found their musical works routinely
appropriated, a similar dynamic impacted native peoples. The most famous
example is the song “The Lion Sleeps Tonight,” derived from the
composition of a Zulu tribesman, who sold the rights for a pittance.126 The
117. See id. at 28-29 (explaining that film-makers and researchers who fix an
indigenous work in a tangible medium are not the authors of that work and therefore
not the original copyright owners).
118. See Johanna Gibson, Intellectual Property Systems, Traditional Knowledge,
and the Legal Authority of Community, 26 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 280, 287 (2004).
119. See Daniel J. Gervais, Internationalization of Intellectual Property: New
Challenges From the Very Old and Very New, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 929, 957-58 (2002).
120. See id. (arguing that traditionally intellectual property rights are awarded for a
limited period before they return to the public domain for others to use).
121. See id.
122. See id. (explaining that the works such as textile patterns, musical rhythms, and
dances may have several versions or incarnations).
123. See Gibson, supra note 118, at 287.
124. See Angela R. Riley, “Straight Stealing”: Towards an Indigenous System of
Intellectual Property Protection, 80 WASH. L. REV. 69, 78 (2005) (indicating that the
destruction of the rain forest in Brazil has destroyed indigenous inhabitants’ language,
religion, and cultural existence).
125. See Nancy Kremers, Speaking with Forked Tongue in the Global Debate on
Traditional Knowledge and Genetic Resources: Are U.S. Intellectual Property Law and
Policy Really Aimed at Meaningful Protection for Native American Cultures?, 15
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 108 n.619 (2004) (noting that subtle
linguistic and conceptual distinctions could help indicate whether Western laws are
suitable for protecting traditional knowledge).
126. See, e.g., Sunder, supra note 24, at 263 (noting that the author of the song,
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song went on to become a massive hit, subsequently used in the Disney
movie “The Lion King.”127 Similarly, a Taiwanese tribal people known as
the Ami found their traditional folk songs recorded without compensation
and used by the artist Enigma.128 As in the case of blues artists, it is
“abundantly clear that intellectual property regimes fail to adequately
capture all of the cultural and economic significance” of the works of
indigenous peoples.129
IV. CONCLUSION
Taken together, critical race, feminist, and internationalist critiques of IP
have the potential to transform the way we think of IP rights and
protection. IP itself is in a period of analytical and practical turbulence,
and a focus on critical perspectives can be invaluable to re-imagining an IP
system that actually provides real incentives to artists at the bottom of
society, rather than multi-national conglomerates concentrated across IP
industries.
The critical project of IP examination can provide ways to achieve racial
and gender equality, rather than reinforcing unequal social constructs
through the dynamics of IP protection. Critical perspectives locate IP in a
social construct, just as race and gender are socially constructed.130
Therefore, IP can be re-engineered to bring about results of distributive
justice and to foster norms of racial and gender equality. These results
would be in keeping with the constitutional mandate of IP protection,
which is designed to insure a robust marketplace of ideas, and to
compensate those who add intellectual, scientific, and artistic value to
society. Further, a critical examination of IP rights is consistent with a
human rights perspective of IP being developed by scholars using
international norms to inform IP entitlements.

Solomon Linda, died in 1962 “with less than $25.00 to his name”).
127. See id. (indicating that Linda assigned the rights to the publisher during the
apartheid-era for less than two dollars).
128. See Angela R. Riley, Indigenous Peoples and the Promise of Globalization: An
Essay on Rights and Responsibilities, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 155, 158-59 (2004)
(claiming that the Lifvon and other Ami tribal members performed their aboriginal
music across Europe in the mid-1990s and were recorded and published without their
knowledge).
129. See id. at 159 (claiming that international law will not come any closer to
protecting indigenous work than already exists because the Western model of
intellectual property is becoming dominant).
130. See Francisco Valdes, Outsider Jurisprudence, Critical Pedagogy and Social
Justice Activism: Marking the Stirrings of Critical Legal Education, 10 ASIAN L.J. 65,
67 (2003) (believing that critical education reminds members of social groups that “law
and society are a constructed, not given, inheritance”).
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